Steven Shavell
Born 1946-01-01
Identifiers
- VIAF109300945
- WikidataQ2347681
- ISNI0000000109329249
- Open LibraryOL1194439A
Top Subjects
- Economic aspects (19)
- Mathematical models (13)
- United States (12)
- Liability (Law) (11)
- Law (11)
- Punishment in crime deterrence (7)
- Contracts (7)
Books by Steven Shavell
Total count: 100
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On valuable opinion and the efficiency of the price system under uncertainty.Harvard Institute of Economic Research1976-01-01
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On moral hazard and insurance.Harvard Institute of Economic Research1976-01-01
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Accidents, liability, and insuranceHarvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University1979-01-01
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On the design of contracts and remedies for breachLaw and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto1980-01-01
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Liability for harm versus regulation of safetyProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1983-01-01
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The judgment proof problemProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1985-01-01
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A note on the optimal use of imprisonment to incapacitateProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1985-01-01
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The optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrentProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1985-01-01
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Criminal law and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrentProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1985-01-01
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An economic analysis of tort lawProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1986-01-01
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An analysis of accident lawLaw and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto1986-01-01
Economic analysis of accident lawHarvard University Press1987-01-01-
Legal advice about contemplated actsthe decision to obtain advice, its social desirability, and protection of confidentialityProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1987-01-01
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A note on the incentive to reveal informationProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1987-01-01
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Optimal sanctions and the incentive to provide evidence to legal tribunalsProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1988-01-01
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An economic analysis of deferred giftsProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1988-01-01
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Specific versus general enforcement of lawProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1989-01-01
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A note on optimal deterrence when individuals choose among harmful actsProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1989-01-01
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Sharing of information prior to settlement or litigationProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1989-01-01
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A note on optimal deterrence when individuals choose among harmful actsNational Bureau of Economic Research1989-01-01
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Two topics on criminal lawspecific v. general enforcement ;A theory of attemptsUniversity of Toronto, Faculty of Law, Law and Economics Programme1989-01-01
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Specific versus general enforcement of lawNational Bureau of Economic Research1989-01-01
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Individual precautions to prevent theftprivate versus socially optimal behaviorProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1990-01-01
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Individual precautions to prevent theftprivate versus socially optimal behaviorNational Bureau of Economic Research1990-01-01
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Liability and the incentive to obtain information about riskProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1991-01-01
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Acquisition and disclosure of information prior to economic exchangeHarvard Law School1991-01-01
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An economic analysis of threats and their illegalityblackmail, extortion, and robberyHarvard Law School1992-01-01
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Suit versus settlement when parties seek nonmonetary judgmentsProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1992-01-01
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The optimal structure of law enforcementHarvard Law School1992-01-01
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Suit versus settlement when parties seek nonmonetary judgmentsNational Bureau of Economic Research1992-01-01
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Contingent valuation of the nonuse value of natural resourcesimplications for public policy and the liability systemProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1992-01-01
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Alternative dispute resolutionan economic analysisHarvard Law School1993-01-01
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The appeals process as a means of error correctionProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1994-01-01
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Any frequency of plaintiff victory at trial is possibleProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1995-01-01
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The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employeesProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1995-01-01
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Threats without binding commitmentHarvard Law School1995-01-01
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The level of litigationprivate versus social optimalityHarvard Law School1996-01-01
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The fundamental divergence between the private and the social motive to use the legal systemHarvard Law School1996-01-01
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Threats without binding commitmentNational Bureau of Economic Research1996-01-01
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Legal adviceHarvard Law School1997-01-01
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On the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrenceHarvard Law School1997-01-01
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Punitive damagesan economic analysisHarvard Law School1997-01-01
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Rewards versus intellectual property rightsHarvard Law School1998-01-01
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The fairness of sanctionssome implications for optimal enforcement policyHarvard Law School1998-01-01
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On the superiority of corrective taxes to quantity regulationInternational Tax Program, Harvard Law School1998-01-01
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Rewards versus intellectual property rightsNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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Principles of fairness versus human welfareon the evaluation of legal policyHarvard Law School2000-01-01
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Economic analysis of lawHarvard Law School2000-01-01
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Any non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principleUniversity of Chicago Press2001-01-01
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Minimum asset requirementsNational Bureau of Economic Research2002-01-01
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The advantage of focusing law enforcement effortHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Economic analysis of accident lawHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Moral rules and the moral sentimentstoward a theory of an optimal moral systemHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Economic analysis of property lawHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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All individuals may be made worse off under any nonwelfarist principleHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Economic analysis of accident lawHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Minimum asset requirementsHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Law versus morality as regulators of conductOxford University Press2002-01-01
Fairness versus Welfare1st editionHarvard University Press2002-04-30-
Fairness versus welfarenotes on the Pareto principle, preferences, and distributive justiceHarvard Law School2003-01-01
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Economic analysis of the general structure of the lawHarvard Law School2003-01-01
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Economic analysis of litigation and the legal processNational Bureau of Economic Research2003-01-01
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On the writing and the interpretation of contractsHarvard Law School2003-01-01
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Economic analysis of public law enforcement and criminal lawHarvard Law School2003-01-01
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On the writing and interpretation of contractsNational Bureau of Economic Research2003-01-01
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Welfare economics, morality, and the lawHarvard Law School2003-01-01
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On the writing and the interpretation of contractsHarvard Law School2003-01-01
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Economic analysis of welfare economics, morality and the lawNational Bureau of Economic Research2003-01-01
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Economic analysis of litigation and the legal processHarvard Law School2003-01-01
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Economic analysis of contract lawHarvard Law School2003-01-01
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Minimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as solutions to the judgment-proof problemNational Bureau of Economic Research2004-01-01
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Minimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as solutions to the judgment-proof problemHarvard Law School2004-01-01
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The appeals process and adjudicator incentivesNational Bureau of Economic Research2004-01-01
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The appeals process and adjudicator incentivesHarvard Law School2004-01-01
Foundations of Economic Analysis of LawBelknap Press2004-03-15
Economic Analysis of LawFoundation Press2004-08-01
Decision Analysis, Game Theory, and InformationFoundation Press2004-08-01
MicroeconomicsFoundation Press2004-08-01
ContractingFoundation Press2004-08-01-
Optimal discretion in the application of rulesHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Liability for accidentsNational Bureau of Economic Research2005-01-01
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Specific performance versus damages for breach of contractHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Liability for accidentsHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Minimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as solutions to the judgment-proof problemRAND2005-01-01
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Is breach of contract immoral?Harvard Law School2005-01-01
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Contracts, holdup, and legal interventionHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Economics and liability for accidentsHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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Contracts, holdup, and legal interventionNational Bureau of Economic Research2005-01-01
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Economic analysis of lawHarvard Law School2005-01-01
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On optimal legal change, past behavior, and grandfatheringHarvard Law School2006-01-01
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Do excessive legal standards discourage desirable activity?Harvard Law School2006-01-01
Fairness versus WelfareNew Ed editionHarvard University Press2006-09-01-
Eminent domain versus government purchase of land given imperpect information about owners' valuationNational Bureau of Economic Research2007-01-01
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The uneasy case for product liabilityHarvard Law School2009-01-01
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Should copyright of academic works be abolished?Harvard Law School2009-01-01
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On the design of the appeals processthe optimal use of discretionary review versus direct appealHarvard Law School2009-01-01
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The corrective tax versus liability as solutions to the problem of harmful externalitiesNational Bureau of Economic Research2010-01-01
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Corrective taxation versus liabilityHarvard Law School2010-01-01
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Corrective taxation versus liabilityNational Bureau of Economic Research2010-01-01
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When is it socially desirable for an individual to comply with the lawHarvard Law School2010-01-01