Alvin E. Roth
Also known as
Alvin E RothAlvin Elliot RothAlvin Roth
Born 1951-01-01
Identifiers
- Open LibraryOL1011639A
- WikidataQ28542
- VIAF109190323
- ISNI0000000110817290
Top Subjects
- Game theory (9)
- Business / Economics / Finance (3)
- Economics (3)
- Business & Economics (3)
- Economic History (3)
- Business & Economics / Economic History (3)
- Mathematical models (2)
Books by Alvin E. Roth
Total count: 44
Subsolutions and the essential standard of cooperative gamesCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1974-01-01
Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goodsCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1975-01-01
The Shapley value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern utilityCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1975-01-01
A note on cooperative games with varying powerCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1975-01-01
A complete characterization of NimCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1975-01-01
Utility functions for simple gamesCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1976-01-01
A note on values and multilinear extensionsCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1976-01-01
The Nash solution and the utility of bargainingCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1977-01-01-
Values for games without sidepaymentssome difficulties with current conceptsInstitute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University1978-01-01
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Axiomatic models of bargaining.Springer1979-01-01
Game-theoretic models and the role of information in bargainingCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1979-01-01
Sociological versus strategic factors in bargainingCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1980-01-01
Some further thoughts on the NTU value and related mattersa rejoinder to AumannCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1981-01-01
Expectations and reputations in bargaining : an experimental studyCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1982-01-01
Information and aspirations in two person bargainingCollege of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign1983-01-01
Laboratory Experimentation in EconomicsSix Points of ViewCambridge University Press1987-12-25
The Shapley ValueEssays in Honor of Lloyd S. ShapleyCambridge University Press1988-10-28
Two-sided matchinga study in game-theoretic modeling and analysisCambridge University Press1990-01-01
Two-Sided MatchingA Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and AnalysisCambridge University Press1992-06-26-
The redesign of the matching market for American physicianssome engineering aspects of economic designNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctionstheory and evidence from a natural experiment on the internetNational Bureau of Economic Research2000-01-01
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The market for federal judicial law clerksUniversity of Chicago2001-01-01
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Kidney exchangeNational Bureau of Economic Research2003-01-01
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Pairwise kidney exchangeNational Bureau of Economic Research2004-01-01
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Efficient kidney exchangecoincidence of wants in a structured marketNational Bureau of Economic Research2005-01-01
Game-Theoretic Models of BargainingNew Ed editionCambridge University Press2005-11-03-
Repugnance as a constraint on marketsNational Bureau of Economic Research2006-01-01
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What have we learned from market design?National Bureau of Economic Research2007-01-01
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Deferred acceptance algorithmshistory, theory, practice, and open questionsNational Bureau of Economic Research2007-01-01
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Repugnance as a constraint on marketsDivision of Research, Harvard Business School2007-01-01
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Game-Theoretic Models of BargainingCambridge University Press2009-01-01
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Shapley ValueEssays in Honor of Lloyd S. ShapleyCambridge University Press2009-01-01
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Laboratory Experimentation in EconomicsSix Points of ViewCambridge University Press2009-01-01
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Marketplace institutions related to the timing of transactionsNational Bureau of Economic Research2010-01-01
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Handbook of Market DesignOxford University Press2013-01-01
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Who Gets WhatThe New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design - From Birth to Death and along the WayHarperCollins Publishers Limited2015-01-01
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Who Gets What - and WhyThe Hidden World of Matchmaking and Market DesignHarperCollins Publishers Limited2015-01-01
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Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2Princeton University Press2016-01-01
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Handbook of Experimental EconomicsPrinceton University Press2016-01-01
Who Gets What―And WhyThe New Economics of Matchmaking and Market DesignBrilliance Audio2016-06-07
Kim Neyi Neden Alir?Timas Yayinlari2016-10-27-
Handbook of Experimental EconomicsPrinceton University Press2020-01-01
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QUIÉN OBTIENE QUÉ Y POR QUÉLA NUEVA ECONOMÍA DEL DISEÑO DE MERCADOSAntoni Bosch Editor, S.A.2022-01-01
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Online and Matching-Based Market DesignCambridge University Press2023-01-01