Overturning Mundell
fiscal policy in a monetary union
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Author
Contributions
- Kempf, Hubert, agrégé de science économique. - Contributor
Publication
2002 - Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minn., Minnesota
Language
English
Word Count
0 words, Guess
Page Count
0 pages
Physical Format
Electronic resource
Identifiers
- Library of Congress Control Number2004616758
- Open LibraryOL3389982M
Classifications
- LCCHB1
Description
"Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell [1961]: a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site.
Subjects
Topics
Series Statement
- Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department staff report ;
- 311
- Staff report (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Research Dept. : Online) ;
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