Why don't issuers choose IPO auctions?
the complexity of indirect mechanisms
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Author
Contributions
- Jirnyi, Andrei - Contributor
- Sherman, Ann - Contributor
- National Bureau of Economic Research - Contributor
Publication
2010 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts
Language
English
Word Count
0 words, Guess
Page Count
0 pages
Physical Format
Electronic resource
Identifiers
- Library of Congress Control Number2010656372
- Open LibraryOL30508575M
Classifications
- LCCHB1
Description
"At least 25 countries have used IPO auctions, but most have since abandoned them. We argue that this is because auctions, being indirect mechanisms, require a level of sophistication above that of many investors. Through suitably calibrated examples, we show that even sophisticated investors can make mistakes while bidding in auctions, especially when facing uncertainty about the number and type of bidders, and such mistakes impose costs on other participants. We provide empirical support for our arguments. IPO auctions have been plagued by unexpectedly large fluctuations in the number of participants, return chasing investors, and high-bidding free riders. Our analysis suggests that a direct mechanism that resembles a transparent version of book building would be preferable to auctions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Subjects
Series Statement
- NBER working paper series -- working paper 16214
- Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 16214.
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