British air power in peripheral conflict, 1919-1976
Our rough guess is there are 30,250 words in this book.
At a pace averaging 250 words per minute, this book will take 2 hours and 1 minutes to read. With a half hour per day, this will take 4 days to read.
How long will it take you?
This book will take an estimated to read at a reading speed averaging words per minute. With 30 minutes per day, this will take to read.
Enter your reading speedYou can take one of our WPM reading speed tests to find your reading speed.
Create a free account to track your reading progress, build your reading list, and set reading goals.
Author
Contributions
- United States. Air Force. - Contributor
- Rand Corporation. - Contributor
Publication
1989 - Rand, Santa Monica, CA, California
Language
English
Word Count
30,250 words, Guess
Page Count
121 pages
Identifiers
- ISBN-100833009745
- ISBN-139780833009746
- Library of Congress Control Number90120581
- OCLC Control Number20821423
- Open LibraryOL1913330M
Classifications
- LCCUG635.G7 H57 1989
Description
Although they rarely involve the vital interests of major powers, peripheral conflicts can be lengthy, can have a potential for escalation, can be marked by intense fighting, and can generate relatively heavy casualties. These traits typify many of the campaigns in which Britain has been involved since World War I and in which air power has been used. This report examines the use of air power by the British in such peripheral conflicts. Five key themes emerge from the operations reviewed in the report: (1) "high-tech," sophisticated aircraft were not always an improvement over the older, slower aircraft that could take off from and land on short, rough airstrips; (2) in almost all of the peripheral conflicts in which Britain was involved, the air-defense threat posed by the enemy was at best negligible; (3) successful operations often hinged on close coordination and communication between air and ground forces; (4) air strikes were often inappropriate or ineffective in rural campaigns and were useless in conflicts with a prominent urban component; and (5) the British appreciated {u2014} particularly in pre-1939 conflicts {u2014} the comparative cost savings of air operations over traditional ground-force operations with similar goals and outcomes.
Reader Reviews
No reviews yet for this book.
Be the first to share your thoughts!