Contributions

  • Jeanne, Olivier. - Contributor
  • National Bureau of Economic Research. - Contributor

Publication

2005 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

13,500 words, Guess

Page Count

54 pages

Identifiers

Description

"In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure. We show within a simple model how competition for repayment between lenders may result in sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. Alleviating this inefficiency requires a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism that fulfills some of the functions of corporate bankruptcy regimes, in particular the enforcement of seniority and subordination clauses in debt contracts"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Subjects

Series Statement

  • NBER working paper series -- no. 11071.
  • Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 11071.

Links

Other Editions

  • Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: the role of seniorityNational Bureau of Economic Research2005-01-01

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