Contributions

  • Ticchi, Davide - Contributor
  • Vindigni, Andrea - Contributor
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics - Contributor

Publication

2009 - Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

4,750 words, Guess

Page Count

19 pages

Identifiers

Description

A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future. Keywords: civil wars, commitment, coups, military, political transitions, political economy. JEL Classifications: H2, N10, N40, P16.

Subjects

Series Statement

  • Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 09-25
  • Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 09-25.

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