Agency problems and goal conflicts
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Author
Contributions
- Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. - Contributor
Publication
2004 - Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, Ga., Georgia
Language
English
Word Count
0 words, Guess
Page Count
0 pages
Physical Format
Electronic resource
Identifiers
- Library of Congress Control Number2004620312
- Open LibraryOL3390568M
Classifications
- LCCHB1
Description
"Agency theory is used to evaluate how the European Union (EU) may deal with the resolution of goal and agency conflicts in dealing with failing financial institutions. Experience in the United States suggests that the financial and regulatory structure being put in place, which relies upon country-sponsored deposit insurance funds and home country responsibility for supervision and lender-of-last-resort functions, is not likely to be robust to the failure of a large EU institution that threatens the solvency of the deposit insurance fund or that poses systemic risk. The author concludes that the EU needs a centralized and common approach to dealing with troubled institutions"--Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta web site.
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Series Statement
- Working paper series / Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ;
- 2004-24
- Working paper series (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta : Online) ;
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