Contributions

  • Fried, Jesse M. - Contributor
  • John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business. - Contributor

Publication

2009 - Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

0 words, Guess

Page Count

0 pages

Physical Format

Electronic resource

Identifiers

Classifications

  • LCCK487.E3

Alternate Titles

  • Paying for long term performance

Description

"Abstract: Firms and regulators around the world are now seeking to ensure that the compensation of public company executives is tied to long-term results to avoid creating incentives for excessive risk-taking. This paper analyzes how this objective can be best achieved. Focusing on equity-based compensation, the primary component of executive pay packages, we identify how such compensation could be best structured to tie remuneration to long-term results rather than short-term gains that might turn out to be illusory. We also analyze how equity compensation could be best designed to prevent the gaming of equity grants at either the front-end or the back-end"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.

Subjects

Topics

SalariesExecutivesFinancial riskEconomic aspectsMathematical modelsLaw and legislationRisk-taking (Psychology)

Places

Series Statement

  • Discussion paper -- no. 658
  • Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 658.

Links

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