Contributions

  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics - Contributor

Publication

2004 - Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

3,500 words, Guess

Page Count

14 pages

Identifiers

Description

Under a firm deadline, agreement in bargaining is often delayed until the deadline. I propose a rationale for this deadline effect that naturally comes from the parties' optimism about their bargaining power. I then show that the deadline effect disappears if the deadline is stochastic and the offers are made arbitrarily frequently. Keywords: optimism, deadline effect, bargaining. JEL Classifications: C72, C73.

Subjects

Series Statement

  • Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 04-36
  • Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 04-36.

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