Author

Contributions

  • National Bureau of Economic Research. - Contributor

Publication

2005 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

0 words, Guess

Page Count

0 pages

Physical Format

Electronic resource

Identifiers

Classifications

  • LCCHB1

Description

"Using detailed Peruvian data measuring bribery, I assess which types of public official are most corrupt and why. I distinguish between the bribery rate and the size of bribes received, and seek to explain the variation in each across public institutions. The characteristics of officials' clients explain most of the variation for bribery rates, but none for bribe amounts. A measure of the speed of honest service at the institution explains much of the remaining variation for both bribery rates and amounts. The results indicate that the bribery rate is higher at institutions with bribe-prone clients, and that bribery rates and bribe amounts are higher where clients are frustrated at slow service. Faster and better service would reduce corruption. Overall, the judiciary and the police are by far the most corrupt institutions"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Subjects

Topics

BriberyEconometric modelsPolitical corruptionBribery -- Peru -- Econometric modelsPolitical corruption -- Peru -- Econometric models

Places

Series Statement

  • NBER working paper series ;
  • working paper 11595
  • Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) ;
  • working paper no. 11595.

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