Publication

1997 - Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn, Connecticut

Language

English

Word Count

62,000 words, Guess

Page Count

248 pages

Identifiers

and 2 more
  • Goodreads3540164
  • LibraryThing450554

Classifications

  • DDC355.4
  • LCCU162 .G26 1997

Description

Scott Sigmund Gartner develops a theory to explain how military and government leaders evaluate wartime performance, how much they change strategies in response to this evaluation, and why they are frequently at odds when discussing the success or failure of strategic performance. Blending history, decision theory, and mathematical modeling, Gartner argues that military personnel do reevaluate their strategies and that they measure the performance of a strategy through quantitative, "dominant" indicators. Gartner tests his argument with three case studies: the British shift to convoys in World War I following the German imposition of unrestricted submarine warfare; the lack of change in British naval policy in the Battle of the Atlantic following the German introduction of Wolf Packs in World War II; and the American decision to deescalate in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. He also tests his approach in a non-war situation, analyzing the Carter Administration's decision to launch the hostage rescue attempt.

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