Anatomy of mistrust

Description

The United States and the Soviet Union missed numerous diplomatic opportunities to resolve differences and control the arms race because neither state trusted the other, according to Deborah Welch Larson. She shows that the goals of Soviet and U.S. leaders were frequently complementary, and an agreement should have been attainable. Lost opportunities contributed to bankruptcy for the Soviet Union, serious damage to the economy of the United States, decreased public support for internationalist policies, and a proliferation of nuclear weapons. Synthesizing different understandings of trust and mistrust from the theoretical traditions of economics, psychology, and game theory, Larson analyzes five cases that might have been turning points in U.S.-Soviet relations: the two-year period following Stalin's death in 1953; Khrushchev's peace offensive from the launching of Sputnik until the U-2 incident; the Kennedy administration; the Nixon-Brezhnev detente; and the Gorbachev period. Larson concludes that leaders in the United States often refused to accept Soviet offers to negotiate because they feared a trap.

First Sentence

Now that the Cold War is over, we must wonder whether the arms race and global competition that nearly bankrupted the United States and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union could have been better managed.

Excerpt

Now that the Cold War is over, we must wonder whether the arms race and global competition that nearly bankrupted the United States and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union could have been better managed.

Subjects

Series Statement

• Cornell studies in security affairs

Other Editions

• Anatomy of mistrust: U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold WarCornell University Press1997-01-01
• Anatomy of mistrustCornell University Press1997-01-01
• Anatomy of MistrustPaperbackCornell University Press2000-10-01