Family altruism and incentives
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Author
Contributions
- World Bank. Development Research Group. Macroeconomic and Growth. - Contributor
Publication
2000 - World Bank, Development Research Group, Macroeconomics and Growth, Washington, DC, District of Columbia
Language
English
Word Count
0 words, Guess
Page Count
0 pages
Physical Format
Electronic resource
Identifiers
- Library of Congress Control Number2002616132
- Open LibraryOL3669297M
Classifications
- LCCHG3881.5.W57
Description
In the presence of imperfect information and uncertainty, altruistic parents might use intergenerational transfers strategically to elicit effort from their children. As a result, gift and bequests are less reactive to the income realizations of the children than the standard altruistic model of the family predicts. Ricardian equivalence holds in this setup whenever the non-negativity constraint on bequests is not binding.
Subjects
Topics
AltruismEconometric modelsInheritance and successionAltruism -- Econometric modelsInheritance and succession -- Econometric models
Genres
- Econometric models
Series Statement
- Policy research working paper ;
- 2505
- Policy research working papers (Online) ;
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