Equilibrium refinement in dynamic voting games
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Author
Contributions
- Egorov, Georgy, 1979- - Contributor
- Sonin, Konstantin - Contributor
- Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics - Contributor
Publication
2009 - Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts
Language
English
Word Count
6,500 words, Guess
Page Count
26 pages
Identifiers
- Internet Archiveequilibriumrefin0926acem
- OCLC Control Number704277894
- Open LibraryOL24976319M
Description
We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games. Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make offers to several players. We establish existence of these equilibria in finite and infinite (for MTHPE) games, provide a characterization of the structure of equilibria, and clarify the relationship between the two concepts. Finally, we show how these concepts can be applied in a dynamic model of endogenous club formation. Keywords: voting, agenda-setting games, Markov trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. JEL Classifications: D72, C73.
Subjects
Series Statement
- Working paper series / Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics -- working paper 09-26
- Working paper (Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics) -- no. 09-26.
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