The 2007 meltdown in structured securitization
searching for lessons, not scapegoats
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Author
Contributions
- Demirgüç-Kunt, Aslı, 1961- - Contributor
- Kane, Edward J. - Contributor
- World Bank. - Contributor
Publication
2008 - World Bank, [Washington, D.C, District of Columbia
Language
English
Word Count
0 words, Guess
Page Count
0 pages
Physical Format
Electronic resource
Identifiers
- Library of Congress Control Number2009655649
- Open LibraryOL23238031M
Classifications
- LCCHG3881.5.W57
Description
"The intensity of recent turbulence in financial markets has surprised nearly everyone. This paper searches out the root causes of the crisis, distinguishing them from scapegoating explanations that have been used in policy circles to divert attention from the underlying breakdown of incentives. Incentive conflicts explain how securitization went wrong, why credit ratings proved so inaccurate, and why it is superficial to blame the crisis on mark-to-market accounting, an unexpected loss of liquidity, or trends in globalization and deregulation in financial markets. The analysis finds disturbing implications of the crisis for Basel II and its implementation. The paper argues that the principal source of financial instability lies in contradictory political and bureaucratic incentives that undermine the effectiveness of financial regulation and supervision in every country in the world. The paper concludes by identifying reforms that would improve incentives by increasing transparency and accountability in government and industry alike. "--World Bank web site.
Subjects
Series Statement
- Policy research working paper -- 4756
- Policy research working papers (Online) -- 4756.
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