Ceo centrality
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Author
Contributions
- Cremers, Martijn - Contributor
- Peyer, Urs - Contributor
- John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business - Contributor
Publication
2007 - Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts
Language
English
Word Count
0 words, Guess
Page Count
0 pages
Physical Format
Electronic resource
Identifiers
- Library of Congress Control Number2007619784
- Open LibraryOL31801333M
Classifications
- LCCK487.E3
Description
"We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured by the CEO. We find that CEO centrality is negatively associated with firm value (as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's Q). Greater CEO centrality is also correlated with (i) lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, (ii) lower stock returnsaccompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, (iii) greater tendency to reward the CEO for luck in the form of positive industry-wide shocks, (iv) lower likelihood of CEO turnover controlling for performance, and (v) lower firm-specific variability of stock returns over time. Overall, our results indicate that differences in CEO centrality are an aspect of firm management and governance that deserves the attention of researchers"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Subjects
Series Statement
- Discussion paper -- no. 601
- Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 601.
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