Contributions

  • Ticchi, Davide. - Contributor
  • Vindigni, Andrea. - Contributor
  • National Bureau of Economic Research. - Contributor

Publication

2009 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

0 words, Guess

Page Count

0 pages

Physical Format

Electronic resource

Identifiers

Classifications

  • LCCHB1

Description

"A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future."--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.

Subjects

Series Statement

  • NBER working paper series -- working paper 15378
  • Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research : Online) -- working paper no. 15378.

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