Eminent domain versus government purchase of land given imperfect information about owner's valuations
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Author
Contributions
- John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business - Contributor
Publication
2007 - Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts
Language
English
Word Count
0 words, Guess
Page Count
0 pages
Physical Format
Electronic resource
Identifiers
- Library of Congress Control Number2007617795
- Open LibraryOL31800741M
Classifications
- LCCK487.E3
Description
"Governments employ two basic policies for acquiring land: taking it through exercise of their power of eminent domain; and purchasing it. The social desirability of these two policies is compared in a model in which the government's information about landowners' valuations is imperfect. Under this assumption, the policy of purchase possesses the market test advantage that the government obtains land only if an owner's valuation is low enough that he is willing to sell it. However, the policy suffers from a drawback when the land that the government needs is owned by many parties. In that case, the government's acquisition will fail if any of the owners refuses to sell. Hence, the policy of eminent domain becomes appealing if the number of owners of the land is large. This conclusion holds regardless of whether the land that the government seeks is a parcel at a fixed location or instead may be located anywhere in a region"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Subjects
Series Statement
- Discussion paper -- no. 598
- Discussion paper (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business : Online) -- no. 598.
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