Contributions

  • Burns, James - Contributor
  • Parkes, David C. - Contributor
  • Barron, Greg, 1968- - Contributor
  • Tumer, Kagan - Contributor
  • Harvard Business School - Contributor

Publication

2008 - Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

9,250 words, Guess

Page Count

37 pages

Identifiers

Description

We describe an auction mechanism in the class of Groves mechanisms that has received attention in the computer science literature because of its theoretical property of being more "learnable" than the standard second price auction mechanism. We bring this mechanism, which we refer to as the "clamped second price auction mechanism," into the laboratory to determine whether it helps human subjects learn to play their optimal strategy faster than the standard second price auction mechanism.

Subjects

Series Statement

  • Working paper / Harvard Business School -- 08-064

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