Contributions

  • Pesenti, Paolo A. - Contributor
  • National Bureau of Economic Research. - Contributor

Publication

2001 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

8,500 words, Guess

Page Count

34 pages

Identifiers

Classifications

  • LCCHB1

Description

"This paper provides a baseline general-equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms that set prices one period in advance. Strict adherence to inward-looking policy objectives such as the stabilization of domestic output cannot be optimal when firms' markups are exposed to currency fluctuations. Such policies induce excessive volatility in exchange rates and foreign sales revenue, leading exporters to set higher prices in response to higher profit risk. In general, optimal rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower import prices. Monetary rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary (or deflationary) bias. Gains from international monetary cooperation are related in an nonmonotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass-through"--Federal Reserve Bank of New York web site.

Subjects

Genres

  • Econometric models

Series Statement

  • NBER working paper series -- no. 8230
  • Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 8230.

Links

Other Editions

  • International dimensions of optimal monetary policyNational Bureau of Economic Research2001-01-01

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