Dynamic inefficiencies in employment-based health insurance system theory and evidence
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Author
Contributions
- Gavazza, Alessandro. - Contributor
- National Bureau of Economic Research. - Contributor
Publication
2007 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass, Massachusetts
Language
English
Word Count
10,000 words, Guess
Page Count
40 pages
Identifiers
- OCLC Control Number174308286
- Open LibraryOL17635442M
Description
We investigate how the employment-based health insurance system in the U.S. affects individuals' life-cycle health-care decisions. We take the viewpoint that health is a form of human capital that affects workers' productivities on the job, and derive implications of employees' turnover on the incentives to undertake health investment. Our model suggests that employee turnovers lead to dynamic inefficiencies in health investment, and particularly, it suggests that employment-based health insurance system in the U.S. might lead to an inefficient low level of individual health during individuals' working ages. Moreover, we show that under-investment in health is positively related to the turnover rate of the workers' industry and increases medical expenditure in retirement. We provide empirical evidence for the predictions of the model using two data sets, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). In MEPS, we find that employers in industries with high turnover rates are much less likely to offer health insurance to their workers. When employers offer health insurance, the contracts have higher deductibles and employers' contribution to the insurance premium is lower in high turnover industries. Moreover, workers in high turnover industries have lower medical expenditure and undertake less preventive care. In HRS, instead we find that individuals who were employed in high turnover industries have higher medical expenditure when retired. The magnitude of our estimates suggests significant degree of intertemporal inefficiencies in health investment in the U.S. as a result of the employment-based health insurance system. We also evaluate and cast doubt on alternative explanations.
Subjects
Topics
Places
Series Statement
- NBER working paper series -- no. 13371.
- Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 13371.
Links
Other Editions
- Dynamic inefficiencies in employment-based health insurance system theory and evidence
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