Books by Drew Fudenberg
Total count: 35
The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete informationRev. February 1984.Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1984-01-01
Sequential bargaining with many buyersDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1985-01-01
Predation without reputationDepartment of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1985-01-01
Dynamic models of oligopolyHarwood Academic Publishers1986-01-01
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organizationan introduction and overviewDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
Finite player approximations to a continuum of playersDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated gamesDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient playerDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
On the robustness of equilibrium refinementsDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organizationan introduction and overviewDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organizationan introduction and overviewDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
Reputation in the simultaneous play of multiple opponentsDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organizationan introduction and overviewDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
Repeated games with long-run and short-run playersDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1988-01-01
Moral hazard and renegotiation in agency contractsMassachusetts Institute of Technology1988-01-01
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated gamesMassachusetts Institute of Technology1988-01-01
Reputation, unobserved strategies, and active supermartingalesMassachusetts Institute of Technology1988-01-01
Perfect Bayesian and sequential equilibriaa clarifying noteMassachusetts Institute of Technology1988-01-01
The Folk Theorem with imperfect public informationDepartment of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1989-01-01
Equilibrium payoffs with long-run and short-run players and imperfect public informationDepartment of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1989-01-01
Monopoly and credibility in asset marketsan exampleDepartment of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1989-01-01
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private informationDepartment of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1989-01-01
Steady state learning and Nash equilibriumDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1991-01-01
Maintaining a reputation when strategies are imperfectly observedDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1991-01-01
Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated gamesDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1991-01-01
Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run playersDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1991-01-01
Self-confirming equilibriumDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1991-01-01
Learning mixed equilibriaDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1992-01-01
The theory of learning in gamesMIT Press1998-01-01
Bo yi lunZhong guo ren min ta xue chu ban she2002-01-01