Contributions

  • Levine, David K. - Contributor

Publication

1998 - MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

69,000 words, Guess

Page Count

276 pages

Identifiers

and 2 more
  • Goodreads770935
  • LibraryThing1297502

Classifications

  • DDC519.3
  • LCCQA269 .F83 1998

Description

In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. In The Theory of Learning in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as the long-run outcome of a process in which less than fully rational players grope for optimality over time. The models they explore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.

Subjects

Series Statement

  • MIT Press series on economic learning and social evolution ;

Other Editions

  • The theory of learning in gamesMIT Press1998-01-01

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