Oliver D. Hart
Identifiers
- Open LibraryOL447588A
Top Subjects
- Contracts (4)
- Corporations -- Finance -- Mathematical models (3)
- Corporations (2)
- Business enterprises (2)
- Economic aspects (2)
- Corporate debt -- Mathematical models (2)
- Corporations -- Finance (2)
Books by Oliver D. Hart
Total count: 35
Incomplete contracts and renegotiationDepartment of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1985-01-01
Bargaining and strikesDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1986-01-01
The theory of contractsRev. Mar. 1986.Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology]1986-01-01
Contract renegotiation and coasian dynamicsDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firmDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01
Capital structure as a control mechanism in corporationsDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1987-01-01-
Property rights and the nature of the firmProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1988-01-01
Property rights and the nature of the firmMassachusetts Institute of Technology1988-01-01-
An economist's perspective on the theory of the firmProgram in Law and Economics, Harvard Law School1989-01-01
Default and renegotiationa dynamic model of debtDepartment of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1989-01-01
Vertical integration and market foreclosureDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1990-01-01
A theory of corporate financial structure based on the seniority of claimsDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1990-01-01-
A theory of corporate financial structure based on the seniority of claimsNational Bureau of Economic Research1990-01-01
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A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capitalNational Bureau of Economic Research1991-01-01
A theory of debt based on the inalienability of human capitalDept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology1991-01-01-
Capital structure decisions of a public companyBanca d'Italia1994-01-01
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Debt and seniorityan analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining managementNational Bureau of Economic Research1994-01-01
Firms, contracts, and financial structureClarendon Press1995-01-01-
The proper scope of governmenttheory and an application to prisonsNational Bureau of Economic Research1996-01-01
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Default and renegotiationa dynamic model of debtNational Bureau of Economic Research1997-01-01
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Foundations of incomplete contractsNational Bureau of Economic Research1998-01-01
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Cooperatives vs. outside ownershipNational Bureau of Economic Research1998-01-01
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Foundations of incomplete contractsHarvard Law School1998-01-01
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On the design of hierarchiescoordination versus specializationNational Bureau of Economic Research1999-01-01
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Different approaches to bankruptcyNational Bureau of Economic Research2000-01-01
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Financial contractingNational Bureau of Economic Research2001-01-01
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Norms and the theory of the firmNational Bureau of Economic Research2001-01-01
A theory of firm scopeMassachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics2002-01-01-
Takeover bids vs. proxy fights in contests for corporate controlHarvard Law School2002-01-01
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Agreeing now to argue latercontracts that rule out but do not rule inHarvard Law School2004-01-01
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Agreeing now to agree latercontracts that rule out but do not rule inNational Bureau of Economic Research2004-01-01
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Contracts as reference pointsNational Bureau of Economic Research2006-01-01
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Hold-up, asset ownership, and reference pointsNational Bureau of Economic Research2007-01-01
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Reference points and the theory of the firmNational Bureau of Economic Research2007-01-01
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现代合约理论The modern contact theoryXiu ding ben.Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ban she2017-01-01