Contributions

  • National Bureau of Economic Research. - Contributor

Publication

2007 - National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass, Massachusetts

Language

English

Word Count

10,500 words, Guess

Page Count

42 pages

Identifiers

Description

We study two parties who desire a smooth trading relationship under conditions of value and cost uncertainty. A rigid contract fixing price works well in normal times since there is nothing to argue about. However, when value or cost is exceptional, one party will hold up the other , damaging the relationship and causing deadweight losses as parties withhold cooperation. We show that a judicious allocation of asset ownership can help by reducing the incentives to engage in hold up. In contrast to the literature, the driving force in our model is payoff uncertainty rather than noncontractible investments.

Subjects

Links

Reader Reviews

No reviews yet for this book.

Be the first to share your thoughts!